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Abstract
Recent developments in the global system of cities present a curious paradox.  With the cost 
of communications declining almost to zero and substantial, though less dramatic reductions in 
transport costs, there is now little technical requirement for most kinds of production to be undertaken 
in any particular location, or for elements of production chains to be located close to each other. This 
fact has had  dramatic consequences for the organisation of manufacturing industry.  Simple 
production chains involving the import of raw materials, usually from developing countries, for 
processing in a specialised centre, have been replaced by far more complex structures. 
Yet, in important respects, the dominance of a small number of ‘global cities’ has never been 
greater. In this paper, it is argued that the dominance of global cities reflects a desire for clustering on 
the part of finance sector professionals and corporate executives. It seems likely that such clustering 
provides private benefits by enhancing the value of personal contacts, but reduces the efficiency and 
profitability of the corporate sector.2
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Cities, connections and cronyism
Recent developments in the global system of cities present a curious paradox.  At the same 
time as corporate leaders and financial market analysts have announced the emergence of a borderless 
world in which ‘location is virtual’, the same leaders and analysts are clustering ever more closely 
together in a handful of ‘global cities’.
The idea of the borderless world reflects the combined impact of the deregulation of 
international flows of goods and services, particularly financial services, since the 1970s and the 
impact of technological changes, most notably those associated with the Internet.
The deregulation of international financial transactions has led to the creation of integrated 
global capital markets, and facilitated the operations of multinational corporations of all kinds. 
Technological change has amplified the effects of policy change. With the cost of communications 
declining almost to zero and transport costs falling as well, there is now no real technical requirement 
for most kinds of production to be undertaken in any particular place, or for elements of production 
chains to be located close to each other. Thus, a borderless world could reasonably be expected to be 
a decentralised world.
Yet, in important respects, the dominance of a small number of “global cities” has never been 
greater. In this paper, it is argued that the dominance of global cities reflects a desire for clustering on 
the part of finance sector professionals and corporate executives. It seems likely that such clustering 
provides private benefits by enhancing the value of personal contacts, but reduces the efficiency and 
profitability of the corporate sector.3
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Communications costs and transport costs
The real cost of communications has been declining steadily since at least 1850, when the 
telegraph, perhaps the most revolutionary single innovation in communications, came into use. A 
further qualitative change emerged with the invention of the telephone in the late 19th century. These 
innovations made possible the development of large corporations with dispersed operations in 
continuous contact. The first corporations of this kind were railroads (Chandler 1977).
Although there were no comparable qualitative innovations in communications between 1900 
and 1990,1 steady technical progress meant that communication services became steadily cheaper 
relative to goods and services in general, and the volume of communications (measured, for example, 
by bits transmitted) rose steadily.
Typical estimates of the rate of multifactor productivity growth in the communications sector 
between 1900 and 1990 are around 5 per cent per year (Butlin, Barnard, and Pincus, 1982, Quiggin 
1996), compared to rates of 1 to 2 per cent for the economy as a whole. Although a difference of this 
magnitude may seem small, over a long period its implications are profound. Relative to the general 
cost of goods and services, this differential in growth rates implies a cost reduction of 95 per cent 
over the period from 1900 to 1990.
This steady progress set the stage for a major qualitative change, the rise of the Internet and 
the World Wide Web. Although the first steps towards the creation of the Internet were taken in the 
1970s, it did not emerge as a major global communications network until around 1990. From this 
point on, and particularly after the development of the World Wide Web, the rate of progress in data 
1 There were important developments in broadcasting (radio and TV) but the effects of these developments were largely confined to 
the household sector. Attempts to use broadcast technologies, particularly radio, for two-way communication had little impact outside specialised 
applications such as military communications.4
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communications accelerated dramatically, to around 70 per cent per year.
With a fully digital communications technology, the rate of technical progress  in 
communications will be close to that for the computer sector, commonly discussed in terms of 
‘Moore’s Law’ (Wikipedia 2005). This long-standing rule has been presented in various versions but 
the most common is that the speed of computation will double every eighteen months, implying an 
annual rate of technical progress of around 70 per cent. 
Over the period of 15 years from 1990 to 2005, annual technical progress of 70 per cent 
would be expected to improve productivity by a factor of around 1.715 = 210 = 1000, and this estimate 
is roughly accurate. A typical dialup modem in 1990 transmitted 2400 bits per second, while a 
standard cable modem in 2005 receives 1 to 3 million bits per second (‘upstream’ transmission speeds 
are typically slower, since most users are primarily concerned with download speed). 
Initially most communications over the Internet took the form of text files. For illustration, 
2400 bits corresponds to about 60 words of unformatted text, so that it would have been possible, in 
1990, to transmit the text of this paper in about a minute. By contrast, at current communications 
speeds, it is possible to transmit a fully formatted book in about a second. 
Equally significantly, the range of content that can be transmitted electronically has grown 
substantially, to include pictures, video images, and sound files. At the same time, most 
administrative and intellectual work processes have been computerised, so that the relevant 
information is easily available for transmission. 
The result is that for a wide variety of work activities, location is no longer a relevant 
constraint, at least in technical terms. Academics can collaborate with colleagues on the opposite side 
of the world, instantaneously sending revised versions of papers and talking freely whenever they 5
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choose. Companies of all kinds can contract out their customer service functions to India or any other 
country where English-speaking workers are available. Products of all kinds can be designed by 
teams in a number of locations, with revised designs being transmitted instantly to production 
facilities located elsewhere. 
Progress in transport has been less dramatic but still substantial. Between 1980 and 1999, the 
total number of containers moved through the worldwide port system increased by over 400% (Paul 
F. Richardson Associates 2002). Equally importantly, computerised tracking of shipments has greatly 
reduced the organisational cost of transporting goods.  The cost of air travel has also declined, making 
“fly-in, fly-out” operations of all kinds more appealing.
Implications for the goods producing sector
The effective elimination of communications costs, combined with substantial reductions in 
transport costs, has had dramatic consequences for the organization of  the goods-producing sector. 
The effects have been most noticeable in relation to manufacturing industry.  Historically, 
global production chains have involved the import of raw or lightly processed materials from 
developing countries, for processing in a specialised manufacturing center, and distribution to 
national and international markets. This simple production chain has been replaced by far more 
complex structures, involving extensive importing and re-exporting. The production of an item as 
simple as a pair of shoes might involve physical and design inputs from a dozen different countries. 
Some indications of this process may be seen in the growth of intra-industry trade and of 
trade undertaken within multinational corporations. The OECD (2002) reports that intra-industry 
trade now accounts for more than 50 per cent of total trade in most OECD countries and the 6
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proportion is increasing in many countries. Although data is available for only a few countries, it 
appears that intra-firm trade plays a major role. Intra-firm trade accounts for around 30 per cent of 
goods imports and exports for Japan and the United States.
Even within countries, specialization has declined greatly. “Detroit” is still shorthand for the 
US motor vehicle industry (or at least for the US-owned section of the industry), but Michigan now 
accounts for only 25 per cent of US vehicle production. Similarly, although it is harder to obtain 
quantitative evidence, it seems clear that the ‘Silicon Valley’ region of California has declined in 
relative importance as a centre for information technology, research, development and manufacturing, 
losing ground to new US centres such as Seattle, Austin and Fairfax County Virginia, as well as to 
overseas locations.
The declining importance of location in the production of goods raises problems for theories 
of economic geography. Problems arise both for traditional theories of economic geography, focusing 
on the importance of proximity to resources and markets, and for the ‘new economic geography’ 
focusing primarily on economies of scale and knowledge spillovers (Fujita, Krugman and Venables 
1999). 
The problems for traditional theories are obvious. As transport and communications costs 
have declined, it has become increasingly feasible and common to locate manufacturing operations 
far from sources of raw materials, and to locate corporate management separately from production 
facilities. Customer relations can be handled by call centres located in distant countries, and these 
operations can be relocated rapidly in response to movements in relative costs.
Less obviously, perhaps, reductions in the cost of communications pose a significant difficulty 
for ‘new economic geography’ models. In an environment where most communication (even with 7
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people located quite nearby) is done by email, the exploitation of economies of scale and knowledge 
spillovers need not involve physical proximity.
The decline of the great manufacturing cities of the developed world has been a major source 
of social problems. As the locational advantages associated with access to a skilled labour force have 
diminished, workers have been forced either to migrate to new centres of employment or to seek new 
occupations, often unsuccessfully or with substantially lower pay. Once-prosperous cities have 
therefore become centres of unemployment and deprivation. Much of the ‘new economic geography’, 
focusing on such issues as policies for urban regeneration, may be seen as a response to the 
breakdown of the traditional economic geography model.
Implications for the services sector
The service sector is large and diverse and the impacts of declining costs of communications 
and transport have been similarly diverse. For some parts of the service sector, such as customer 
service and computer programming, location has ceased to be relevant, even more completely than in 
the case of activities producing goods. The central characteristic of these services is that the output 
takes a form that can be communicated electronically, using voice telephony and email in the case of 
customer service and digital file transfer in the case of computer programming.
On the other hand a large and growing segment of the service sector involves the direct 
provision of personal services ranging from health and education to the services of cafes and 
restaurants. Although there have been attempts to deliver some of these services remotely, notably 
including the provision of education services over the Internet, these have met with little success. The 




On the basis of the distinctions drawn above, it might be expected that of all sectors of the 
economy, the location of financial market functions should have been most transformed by the 
reductions in communications costs. Nearly all the work of financial markets can be performed 
electronically and remotely, and most financial transactions in modern economies involve parties in 
widely separated physical locations, transacting through intermediaries who are also physically 
remote.
The financial and business services sector has other characteristics that might be expected to 
encourage decentralisation. The requirement for detailed, continuous keeping of accurate records 
implies the need for a high degree of computerisation. As a result, financial services of various kinds 
were among the first business activities to be computerised. This in turn means that most of the 
material with which work is undertaken in the financial sector is in a form that facilitates electronic 
communication.
In addition, some aspects of regulation of the financial sector encourage physical dispersion. 
Financial sector enterprises are supposed to maintain ‘Chinese walls’ between different groups of 
workers, such as securities analysts and investment bankers, in order to ensure that advice given to 
one group of clients is not compromised by the business interests of other groups within the firms. 
Similarly, partners in law and accounting firms may be subject to conflicts of interests, precluding 
them from giving advice to one party in a transaction or dispute, if close colleagues represent other 
parties. The likelihood that conflicts will be judged material is enhanced if the relevant partners are 




As many observers have noted, reductions in the cost of transport and communications 
should be favorable to the emergence of a decentralised global economic structure. Yet, in important 
respects, the dominance of a small number of ‘global cities’ has never been greater. This observation 
is reflected in the steadily growing academic and popular literature on the topic.
The term ‘global cities’ has largely displaced the older terminology of ‘world cities’ arising 
from the work of Hall (1966). The literature on global cities is diverse, but one feature is constant. 
The defining characteristics of global cities are always taken to include a high concentration of 
activity in the corporate and financial services sector, including banking and finance, accounting, 
advertising and corporate headquarters. 
Beaverstock, Smith and Taylor (1999) take the concentration of corporate services activity as 
the primary empirical indicator of global city status. They examine the presence of major service 
centres in accounting, advertising, banking and legal services and classify global cities into three 
groups (alpha, beta and gamma) with subdivisions between groups. The highest-ranking group 
consists of London, New York, Paris and Tokyo.
Beaverstock, Smith and Taylor provide a literature survey indicating that nearly all 
researchers identify New York, London and Tokyo as part of the core group and most include Paris. 
Frankfurt, Hong Kong and Singapore, which are identified as the second rank of the alpha cities by 
Beaverstock, Smith and Taylor, also appear frequently in other rankings.
Alderson and Beckfield (2004) adopt an alternative approach with a more rigorous 
theoretical basis, but reach very similar conclusions. Alderson and Beckfield examine power relations 
between 3500 cities in a network analysis. The central idea is to examine relationships between 10
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corporate headquarters and branch offices to determine which cities are centres of power, and which 
play a merely peripheral role. Network analysis is a formal statistical technique for determining these 
relationships and providing a representation of a system of relationships, such as the world city 
system.
Alderson and Beckfield find that the core of the city world system  is the block made up of 
London, New York, Paris and Tokyo, and that these four cities are much more powerful than any of 
the others. This is consistent with the results derived by Beaverstock, Smith and Taylor (1999) ,using 
labour force measures. As this analysis indicates, the new global city system is based on the 
concentration of corporate headquarters and financial markets in a small number of places. 
Concentration and the finance sector
The fact that global city analyses based on measures of corporate headquarters and financial 
service are feasible, and produce consistent and stable results. is a reflection of the geographical 
concentration of these activities, particularly at the high levels associated with the operations of the 
largest corporations. Several categories of explanation for such concentration may be offered. They 
will be referred to as ‘efficiency-based’, ‘managerial’ and ‘network’ explanations.
In explaining the concentration of the financial sector in global cities, it seems natural to 
focus on the location of corporate headquarters. Corporate location decisions are discretionary and 
attract other corporate services such as banking, advertising and legal services.
Efficiency-based explanations of financial sector concentration
There are several reasons why efficiency might be enhanced by the location of corporate 
headquarters in global cities. An obvious possibility is that close proximity to major financial markets 11
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allows corporate management to attract capital more cheaply. An immediate implication is that a 
decision to locate corporate headquarters in a global city will attract equity investment and therefore 
increase share prices.
The evidence does not support this prediction. Ghosh, Rodriguez, and Sirmans (1995) 
examined changes in the share price of companies that announced corporate relocations. The stock 
market reaction is significantly positive when relocation decisions are attributed to cost savings, 
indicating that cost savings available at less centralised locations outweigh any loss of enhancements 
associated with spatial clustering at urban centers. 
In contrast, decisions to move to high-cost locations, such as the global cities mentioned 
above, tend to reduce stock prices. It seems that stock market investors do not believe that relocation 
to a global city is an efficient move.
Some supporting evidence is provided by analysis of stock market reactions to corporate 
mergers, which are commonly associated with a move to a more central corporate headquarters 
location, often in a first-tier or second-tier global city. In general, it has been found that such mergers 
reduce the value of the acquiring company. A common interpretation of these results is that chief 
executives pursue mergers to secure personal benefits such as higher salaries, or because of a belief in 
their own capacities that is, on average, overstated.
The other standard rationale for geographical concentration is that it provides access to a pool 
of skilled workers. For this to be economically relevant, it must be true that workers with the relevant 
skills can be hired more cheaply in global city locations. This will be true if, from the viewpoint of 
such workers, the benefits of living in a global city outweigh the higher cost of living. However, what 
evidence is available suggests that wages for most categories of workers, adjusted for skill, is higher 12
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in global cities than in more peripheral locations. Anecdotal evidence suggests that lots of people 
make a temporary move to global cities, attracted by the opportunity to earn big money, before 
returning home. 
In a traditional economic geography model, the most natural choice for a corporate 
headquarters location would be near a major production centre. It is obvious, however, that such 
choices are not being made by (nonfinancial) corporations that locate their headquarters in a ‘global 
city’. Manufacturing activity in global cities is limited, and the retail service sector is notable for the 
representation of high-end luxury providers (Harrods, Tiffany’s and so on) rather than as an important 
location for mass-market service corporations like WalMart and Tescos.
Managerial explanations of financial sector concentration
An alternative group of explanations for financial sector concentration focuses on the 
interests and concerns of the executives who actually make location decisions, rather than those of the 
shareholders on whose behalf they are supposedly acting. Ever since Berle and Means (1932), 
analysts of the corporation have made the point that corporate managers have a considerable degree 
of discretion to use the resources of the corporation to pursue their own goals, a point that has been 
reinforced by the theoretical literature on the principal–agent problem.
A simple version of the managerial interest hypothesis is that managers choose to locate 
corporate headquarters in global cities because these are pleasant places to live, at least for high-
income earners. As has already been noted, global cities are characterised by the availability of a wide 
range of luxury retail services and of  high-prestige cultural activities (opera, Broadway and West End 
theatre and so on). Global city office locations are prestigious in themselves and are typically more 13
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luxurious than those found elsewhere.
In an environment where executive pay is subject to close scrutiny or even, as in the United 
States, constrained by law (corporate salaries in excess of $1 million per year are not deductible) it is 
natural for executives to seek to maximise returns in kind. The choice of a global city location is ideal 
in this respect since the benefits are shared by all senior managers, and it is impossible to impute a 
cost to any individual.
As the results of Ghosh, Rodriguez, and Sirmans (1995) show, investors are aware that global 
city locations amount to an increase in the compensation of senior managers and react adversely. It 
might be expected, therefore that increased reliance on stock-based compensation, such as options, 
would tend to encourage more cost-effective location decisions, and it is notable that the technology 
firms that pioneered this form of compensation, such as Apple and Microsoft, tend not to be 
headquartered in global cities. However, no systematic study of this issue appears to have been 
undertaken. 
Network-based explanations of managerial preferences
An alternative explanation of managerial preference for location in global cities is that such 
location facilitates the creation and maintenance of personal networks of trust and obligation. Storper 
and Venables (2004) present this idea as part of a more general discussion of the role of face-to-face 
contact or ‘buzz’ in explaining urban agglomeration.
Similarly, Wood and Parr (2004) argue that transactions costs are an important source of 
agglomeration economies, and may be increasing in importance relative to the technical economies of 
scale and scope that have previously received more attention. Wood and Parr focus on the trust and 14
15
16
honour relationships that underlie the formation of spatially concentrated personal networks. Like 
Storper and Venables, they stress the crucial role of face-to-face contact and ‘body language’, 
particularly in the formation of personal trust. 
Networks of personal contacts may connect workers in the same industry, assisting them in 
such activities as job search. Alternatively, personal networks may connect managers of 
manufacturing or service enterprises with others in financial, accounting or legal firms. Given the 
centrality of financial, accounting and legal services in global cities, the latter seem likely to be the 
most important.
Writers of career advice are unanimous in stressing the importance of networks in promoting 
ones career. It is less clear, however, that the operations of networks are beneficial to firms as 
employers. On the one hand, networks can perform a valuable screening function. If existing 
employees gain or lose reputational capital by recommending good or bad members of their 
networks, they will have an incentive to screen carefully. In the absence of such incentives, however, 
reliance on networks may produce inefficiency and nepotism.
These concerns are even more pronounced in relation to personal networks connecting 
financial enterprises with their clients. It is reasonable to assume that such personal networks 
facilitate the development of business relationships between the firms in question, leading to flows of 
payments on services based on relationships of personal trust and shared interests, rather than on 
formal and transparent contractual relationships.
Such a system is commonly referred to as ‘relationship capitalism’ or, more pejoratively as 
‘crony capitalism’. In general, it is viewed favourably during booms, when the disregard of process 
tends to facilitate rapid generation of wealth, and less favourably during recessions when the 15
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exchange of personal favours and the evasion of formal controls tends to be reclassified (often 
retrospectively) as corrupt.
A prominent critique of relationship capitalism is that of Rajan and Zingales (2003). Quoted 
by Postrel (2003), one of the authors (Rajan) says 
Relationship capitalism is basically where a lot more is done 
through contacts -- who you know, how you know them -- rather than 
through arm's-length contracts, more transparency, more open dealing and 
so on …. In relationship capitalism, we do less through contracts and more 
through handshakes.
Postrel uses these ideas to attack the idealised, and largely mythical, small-town bankers of 
the past in favor of today's more impersonal system. Postrel is correct to say personal relationships 
with bankers are no longer important for retail borrowers in most developed countries. But while 
distancing themselves from most of their customers, members of the financial sector have gathered 
together ever more closely in centres like New York and London. In this respect, the importance of 
contacts and personal relationships has never been greater.
On balance, the evidence supports the view that socially undesirable forms of networking 
play an important role in promoting concentration of financial sector activities in global cities. As the 
dominance of global cities has increased, concerns about corporate governance have grown, as have 
doubts about the effectiveness of the checks and balances provided by accountants, auditors and 
rating agencies. There is a clear contradiction between the stated roles of these professionals, which 
involves judgements based on transparent and impersonal evidence, and their participation in 16
17
18
networks of personal trust and mutual obligation. 
Concluding comment
As Venables and Storper argue, the ‘buzz’ associated with face-to-face contract remains 
crucial in the world of business, even as most other aspects of work have been dispersed and become 
reliant on electronic communication. However, it should not be assumed that such face-to-face 
contact is socially benign. As Adam Smith (1976 [1776], vol. I, bk. I, ch. 10) observed more than 200 
years ago ‘ People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the 
conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public}.
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